Call: Meta-Analysis on Bribery Games





Nils KöbisIna Kubbe, Shaul Shalvi and Bruno Verschuere are conducting a meta-study on bribery games.

Our aim is to compare behavior across behavioral paradigms used to study bribery in the lab, in the field and online to obtain aggregate insights about behavioral factors of bribery.

We kindly ask you to share data sets or manuscripts of bribery games that fulfill the following inclusion criteria:


  • The study uses a paradigm that is explicitly labeled as a bribery game
  • OR
  • The paradigm:
  1. uses an incentivized (financial or non-financial incentives), behavioral paradigm, i.e., no hypothetical set-ups
  2. entails a transaction between at least two players that is mutually beneficial to both players
  3. power asymmetry exists between the players
  4. a successful transaction between agents creates negative externalities (that can be on other players or more general entities, e.g. deduction of a donation for a charitable cause)


Please send manuscripts that fulfill these criteria to or


A few examples of studies that qualify are:

Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B., & Renner, E. (2002). An experimental bribery game. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 18, 428–454.

Alatas, V., Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N. & Gangadharan, L. (2009). Gender and corruption: Insights from an experimental analysis. Southern Economic Journal, 75(3), 663–680.

Banerjee, R. (2014). On the Interpretation of Bribery in a Laboratory Corruption Game: Moral Frames and Social Norms. Experimental Economics (Vol. 19). Aarhus, Denmark: Springer US.

Barr, A., & Serra, D. (2008). Corruption and culture: An experimental analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 94, 862–869.

Cameron, L. A., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N., & Gangadharan, L. (2009). Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore. Journal of Public Economics, 93(7–8), 843–851.

Frank, B., & Schulze, G. G. (2000). Does economics make citizens corrupt? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 43, 101–113.

Jiang, T., Lindemans, J. W., & Bicchieri, C. (2015). Can trust facilitate bribery? Experimental evidence from China, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands. Social Cognition, 33(5), 1–26.

Kubbe, I. (2018). Let’s Play: Bribery Games in the US and Germany. In Corruption and Norms (pp. 153-185). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Köbis, N. C., van Prooijen, J.-W., Righetti, F., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2017). The Road to Bribery and Corruption. Psychological Science.

Lambsdorff, J. G., & Frank, B. (2011). Corrupt reciprocity – Experimental evidence on a men’s game. International Review of Law and Economics, 31(2), 116–125.

Muthukrishna, M., Francois, P., Pourahmadi, S., & Henrich, J. (2017). Corrupting cooperation and how anti-corruption strategies may backfire. Nature Human Behaviour, 1(7), 138.

Salmon, T. C & Serra, D. (2017). Corruption, Social Judgment and Culture: An Experiment

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 142 : 64-78.

Van Veldhuizen, R. (2013). The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation. Journal of Economic Psychology, 39, 341–356.



We would love to include all relevant studies (published or unpublished). So if in doubt, please email us (to or to see if your study fits. Most often, this will require minimal effort on your side, we look forward to hearing from you before October 1st, 2018.


Thanks very much,

Nils Köbis, Ina Kubbe, Shaul Shalvi & Bruno Verschuere